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Abstract
Throughout late 2001 and 2002, the Australian Govern-
ment, seeking re-election, campaigned on a tough line
against so-called “illegal” immigrants. Represented as
“queue jumpers,” “boat people,” and “illegals,” most of
these asylum seekers came from Middle Eastern countries,
and, in the main, from Afghanistan and Iraq. This paper
explores the way particular representations of cultural dif-
ference were entwined in media and government attacks
upon asylum seekers. In particular, it analyzes the way
key government figures articulated a negative under-
standing of asylum seekers’ family units – representing
these as “foreign” or “other” to contemporary Australian
standards of decency and parental responsibility. This rep-
resentational regime also drew upon post-September 11
representations of Middle Eastern people, and was em-
ployed to call into question the validity of asylum-seekers’
claims for refugee status. Manufactured primarily
through the now notorious “children overboard” incident,
these images became a central motif of the 2001 election
campaign. This paper concludes by examining the way
these representations of refugees as “undeserving” were
paralleled by new Temporary Protection Visa regulations
in Australia.
Résumé
Tout au long de la période de la fin 2001 et de l’année
2002, le gouvernement australien, en quête d’un second
mandat, mena sa campagne électorale en adoptant une
ligne dure contre ce qu’il appelait les immigrants
« illégaux ». Représentés comme des « resquilleurs »,
« boat people » et « illégaux », la plupart de ces deman-
deurs d’asile provenaient de pays du Moyen-Orient, prin-
cipalement de l’Afghanistan et de l’Irak. Cet article
examine la façon dont une certaine image des différences
culturelles a été tissée dans les attaques des médias et du
gouvernement contre les demandeurs d’asile. Tout
spécialement, il examine comment des personnages clés
du gouvernement ont projeté une interprétation négative
de la cellule familiale des demandeurs d’asile – les
représentant comme étant « différentes » ou
« étrangères » aux normes de la société australienne con-
temporaine en matière de décence et de responsabilité
parentale. Cet ensemble de représentations mit aussi à
contribution des images des gens du Moyen-Orient dans
la période de l’après 11 septembre, et fut exploité pour re-
mettre en question la validité des demandes des deman-
deurs d’asile pour le statut de réfugié. Fabriquées avant
tout à partir de l’incident notoire « les enfants à la mer »,
ces images devinrent un leitmotiv de la campagne élec-
torale de 2001. L’article conclut en examinant la façon
dont ces représentations des réfugiés, comme étant « non
méritants », furent accompagnées de nouveaux règle-
ments introduisant un Visa de protection temporaire
(« Temporary Protection Visa ») en Australie.
While there are many aspects of the AustralianGovernment’s approach to asylum seekers thatare worthy of comment and critique, this paper
focuses on the representation of refugees by the Government
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and media throughout the so-called asylum-seeker “crisis”
of 2001-02. I hesitate to use the term “discourse analysis” in
this article, as the term often has an “agentless” sense to it –
wherein social knowledges are constituted by the exclusion
of other perspectives, but the actors involved are often
vaguely defined.1 In this case, I think the more appropriate
term is propaganda2 — in that the representational regime
clearly emanated from the governing party and was publi-
cized through official media sources (primarily ministerial
press releases and interviews), with the apparent objective of
stigmatizing a marginal group as part of a strategy for main-
taining political power.
On 7 October 2001, at the commencement of the first
week of the federal election campaign, the Government
notified the media that a vessel of asylum seekers had been
intercepted off the west Australian coast. A particular an-
nouncement was made at the press conference: Immigra-
tion Minister Philip Ruddock informed the media of
reports that asylum seekers were “in the water,” and, more
disturbingly, that asylum seekers had “thrown their chil-
dren overboard.” Thus was born one of the most contro-
versial and contentious incidents to have taken place inside
an Australian federal election campaign for many years. To
cut a long story short, nothing of the sort had happened at
all. There was no evidence that children had been thrown
overboard, and photos used to reinforce the story were
known, a day after their release, to be from a separate rescue
incident. Though the Defence Minister and the Prime Min-
ister’s office were separately informed that the story was
false, the Government did not publicly correct it. Evidently,
too much electoral mileage was being made. Eventually, a
Senate inquiry into the incident would reveal a disturbing
collection of untruths, failures to communicate, incidents
of political advisors manipulating the flow of information
to protect their minister, and unanswered question about
who knew.3
This paper examines the Government and media repre-
sentations of asylum seekers throughout the pre- and post-
election period of 2001-02. In particular I examine the way
the representations of refugees as “undeserving” were par-
alleled by new Temporary Protection Visa regulations in
Australia. In a favourable climate of uncertainty that followed
September 11, the federal Government focused their re-
election campaign strongly on the issue of “border protec-
tion”. Appealing to a wide cross-section of Australian soci-
ety (and particularly to supporters of the right-wing
populist One Nation Party), the Coalition Government
promised that “we will decide who comes to country, and
the circumstances under which they come.”4 Central to this
message was the vilification of the asylum seekers on Sus-
pected Illegal Entry Vessel (SIEV) 4. Through this, and
other related campaigns, the Government sought to portray
asylum seekers as unworthy of protection, and manufac-
tured a rhetorical “crisis” of national sovereignty, borders,
and national identity that would require a new “solution.”
“Border Protection”
On 27 August 2001, two and a half months before the
election, Australia refused entry to the Norwegian freighter
Tampa, a vessel carrying 433 asylum seekers rescued from a
sinking Indonesian ferry. Though the Tampa was only one
of a number of arrivals in 2001, Prime Minister John
Howard chose this vessel to flag a major change in Australian
policy, vowing that the asylum seekers on the Tampa “would
never set foot on Australian soil.” On August 29 the Tampa
entered Australian waters, and was prevented from reaching
land by Navy vessels. After a six-day standoff, New Zealand,
and, under some pressure, Nauru, and eventually Papua
New Guinea agreed to accept the asylum seekers for proc-
essing. Thus was born the “Pacific solution” to Australia’s
so-called refugee “crisis.”5 In September, the Government
excised certain island territories from the migration zone.
Justifying their actions, the Government warned of five
thousand more asylum seekers in Indonesia. Ruddock spoke
of “whole villages in Iran” en route to Australia.6
Within weeks of this event, long-standing uses of terms
such as “floods” or “waves” of refugees to represent un-
authorized arrivals as a threat to the integrity of the nation-
state7 would be heightened by post-September 11 fears of
Arabic and Muslim peoples. In what can only be considered
a calculated manipulation of public opinion, the Govern-
ment’s selective and distorted release of information
throughout this period promoted attitudes of fear and re-
sentment towards asylum seekers.8 This agenda came to a
head two days into the federal election campaign.
“Children Overboard”
On 7 October 2001, a communiqué was phoned in from
HMAS Adelaide, reporting that SIEV 4 had entered Austra-
lian waters. Onboard the vessel were 219 asylum seekers, the
vast majority of them from Iraq. At 7:30 a.m. the HMAS
Adelaide fired warning shots ahead of the boat, and at 7:35
the vessel was boarded. At this point, a few people jumped
into the water, later reboarding the boat. Commander Banks
of the Adelaide reported an asylum seeker “preparing to
throw a child overboard.” At some point in the chain of
reportage, the word child became “children,” and the word
“preparing” was dropped altogether. At 9:50 a.m. Minister
Ruddock was informed. Without any supporting documen-
tary evidence, a press conference was called at 11:30 a.m.9
“With the intention of putting us under duress,” Rud-
dock announced, asylum seekers had “thrown their chil-
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dren in the water.” He went on to say that he regarded these
as “some of the most disturbing practices I have come across
in public life…clearly planned and premeditated.” Follow-
ing suit, the Prime Minister quickly went public. A theme
that would shortly become a prominent motif of the elec-
tion campaign emerged forcefully. Asylum seekers were
publicly declared to be undeserving, with value systems
deeply foreign to those of Australian society. In particular,
the asylum seekers were represented as hostile or foreign to
Western attitudes towards family and children.
What sort of parents would throw their children over-
board? Not a genuine refugee, suggested the Prime Minister:
I don’t want in Australia anyone who would throw their own
children into the sea. There’s something to me incompatible
between somebody who claims to be a refugee, and somebody
who would throw their own children into the sea. It offends the
natural instinct of protection, and delivering security and safety
to your children.10
For Prime Minister Howard and his front bench, this
episode would be represented as an affront, an inexplicable
and repellent form of cultural difference which must be
neither recognized nor given legitimacy by soft Govern-
ment action. The asylum seekers would be deported to
Nauru or Papua New Guinea; they would not be given
permission to land. Asked how old the children were, Rud-
dock replied:
I don’t have that detail, but I imagine the sort of children who
would be thrown would be those who could be readily lifted and
tossed without objection from them, but I don’t have that level
of detail.11
So, the Government speculated, they must have been
young children – young enough not to be able to voice
objections. Naturally, by 9 October, media demands for
more information had the Prime Minister under pressure.
Howard asked the Defence Minister, Peter Reith, for evi-
dence. Shortly afterwards, the Defence Minister’s media
advisor, Ross Hampton, demanded documentation from
the Department of Defence. Defence reported at this point
that there was “no evidence we could find” that children
had been thrown overboard. Nonetheless, on 10 October,
Hampton released photos of a woman and a child in the sea,
purportedly taken on 7 October.
Later on the 10th, in a radio interview, the Defence
Minister referred to the newly released photos, claiming it
was an “absolute fact that children were thrown over-
board.” A Senate inquiry would later discover no evidence
that children had been thrown in the water and, further,
that the Government had been informed of this as early as
9 October. Misleading photos had been produced on the
10th.12
As the Senate inquiry later revealed, the photos were in
fact taken on 8 October, when the boat in question, SIEV 4,
started to take on water. People had jumped overboard
because the vessel was sinking,13 and indeed, much later,
evidence was given which suggested the Navy had ordered
everyone to jump off so they could be picked up.14 The
released photos were part of a series documenting the
Navy’s rescue operation.
On the day the photo was released, public affairs chief
Brigadier Gary Bornholt of Defence informed Ross Hamp-
ton that the photos were not from the 7th, but from the 8th,
when the boat sank. Hampton later claimed that he “never
received” the call. The next day (11 October), the Prime
Minister’s department directly approached Defence for fur-
ther information. Defence confirmed their advice that there
was “no indication that children had been thrown over-
board.”
By 8 November, just two days before the election, leaked
reports from sailors on Christmas Island had started to cast
serious doubts on the Government’s version of events.15 In
an effort to deflect increasing scepticism from journalists,
Defence Minister Reith released a Navy video of the inci-
dent, warning that it was “grainy” and possibly inconclu-
sive. The video showed a man standing at the railing on the
boat holding a child. It did not show children thrown
overboard.
It was later revealed that Reith told the Prime Minister of
departmental doubts over the photos on 7 November.
Nonetheless, at a press conference on 8 November, the
Prime Minister did not mention these official misgivings
when questioned about the now famous photos. Indeed, the
pattern of stigmatization continued. Quoting from an Of-
fice of National Assessments (ONA) report, the Prime Min-
ister repeated the slightly modified assertion that “asylum
seekers wearing life jackets jumped into the sea and children
were thrown in with them.” The ONA report was in fact a
summary of earlier ministerial statements, rather than an
independent Government report.
As the official interpretation of events started to falter,
the Prime Minister tried a new tack. Even if the asylum
seekers had not thrown their children overboard, he sug-
gested, they were the sort of people who would. He an-
nounced, “[S]uch tactics have previously been used
elsewhere, for example by people smugglers and Iraqi asy-
lum seekers on boats intercepted by the Italian Navy.”16
This episode illustrates a pattern of dehumanization,
with a specific discourse concerning asylum seekers’ family
values — representing these as “foreign” or “other” to
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contemporary Australian standards of decency, parental
responsibility, and gender identity. This representational
regime also drew upon post-September 11 representations
of Middle Eastern people, and was employed to call into
question the validity of asylum-seekers’ claims for refugee
status, painting these as “undeserving.”
Family Values
Further examples of this particular pattern of dehumaniza-
tion were evident in other Government press statements. In
2000, the Western Australian Liberal Senator Ross Lightfoot
described unauthorized arrivals as “queue jumpers,” “crimi-
nals,” and “lawbreakers.” The release went on to say, “several
of our callers have questioned the morality of the male
refugees for abandoning their wives and children in their
poverty stricken war-torn countries, and for using their
families’ life savings to escape to a life of comparative com-
fort." Moreover, Lightfoot argued, asylum seekers threaten
our democratic principles with “their prejudices and intol-
erances.”17 This additional theme of cultural difference as
“threatening” to the body politic connected with existing
populist resentment over multiculturalism, recently stirred
up by the right-wing populist One Nation Party.
Back in the election campaign of October 2001, the slurs
continued. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer remarked,
“[A]ny civilised people would never dream of treating their
own children that way.”18 Through Liberal Senator George
Brandis, the Government also made claims that “a potential
illegal immigrant [had] attempted to strangle a child.” The
following February, a Senate inquiry found that Navy witness
statements reportedly relating to this alleged episode did not
exist.19 Similarly, in November, while under pressure con-
cerning the illegal detention of fifty-three solo children, Im-
migration Minister Ruddock claimed “that children of asylum
seekers were often sent solo into Australian waters so the
Government would be forced to accept their families.”20
For its part, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) main-
tained a complicit silence, fearing a populist electoral back-
lash. It was a position difficult for many members, and one
which alienated many progressives from their support base.
Indeed, the nadir of political point scoring on this issue
possibly occurred shortly after 353 asylum seekers drowned
en route to Australia. In this instance, it was the opposition
leader who took the opportunity, immediately after news of
the tragedy had broken. Referring to the incident solely as a
“failure of policy,” he argued that “we have not got the agree-
ment we need with Indonesia in order to be able to ensure that
those who put themselves in such danger are not encouraged
... to come to this country.”21 Inside the election campaign, it
appeared that the populist imperative of exclusion would
override all considerations of human sympathy.
Later, the Government reflected upon this tragic episode
in terms of the personal responsibility of the asylum seekers.
While expressing deep regret for the tragedy, Ruddock
maintained that he was not “going to be made to feel guilty
about people who put themselves in the hands of smugglers
and who pay large amounts of money knowing that they’re
going to break our law.”22 He also claimed that 90 per cent
of those on the boat were seeking “family reunion out-
comes” rather than refugee status, and should have stayed
in Indonesia where they were “safe and secure.”23 These
comments resonated with Ruddock’s earlier views on pa-
rental and familial responsibility, made after a group of
asylum seekers had drowned near Ashmore Reef in Decem-
ber 2000. Ruddock noted in a press release that he found it
“very difficult to comprehend” that any refugees in Austra-
lia would “willingly break the law to help their relatives –
often young children – embark on such a dangerous and
ill-advised journey.”24
Clearly, asylum seekers could not win. They were “im-
moral” if they left their wives and children behind in third
countries to undertake perilous voyages to find asylum, and
then sought family reunion. When denied the possibility of
family reunion by Government policy, they were “irrespon-
sible” if they brought their wives and children on these
dangerous voyages.
After the election, a new opposition leader chimed in
with a distinctive take on the issue, again using conceptions
of the family as the key means of representing and explain-
ing the issues at stake. Women and children, he argued,
should be released from detention centres. The ALP did not
oppose mandatory detention per se, but rather the detention
of “vulnerable” family members considered deserving of pro-
tection. By contrast, male asylum seekers were implicitly cast
as potential threats to the Australian body politic.
Lip Sewing
Meanwhile, the Government continued to portray related
issues in terms of “cultural differences” that were hostile and
foreign to Australian standards of decency. In January, fol-
lowing a post-Taliban “freeze” on Afghan asylum claims in
Australia, reports emerged that over two hundred asylum
seekers in the Woomera detention centre were engaged in a
hunger strike, and that more than forty of the hunger strikers
– mainly Afghans – had stitched their lips together.25 Despite
evidence from Woomera doctors that self-harming behav-
iour among traumatized detainees had been “almost a daily
occurrence” for over six months,26 Immigration Minister
Ruddock framed this issue as one of cultural difference,
condemning the episode as something which would offend
Australians. “Lip sewing is a practice unknown in our cul-
ture,” he declared. The Minister went on to state Australian’s
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revulsion at this so-called “cultural practice,” which, to his
mind, offended national standards of decency and rational,
self-regarding behaviour: “It’s something that offends the
sensitivities of Australians. The protesters believe it might
influence the way we might respond. It can’t and it won’t.”27
Once again, in this case, Government responses to the
actions of asylum seekers involved accusations of child
abuse.28 It was alleged that adult detainees had forcibly
sewed the lips of children. Separate investigations by the
South Australian Government and the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission, with the cooperation of
Australian Correctional Management, found no evidence
of parents encouraging children to engage in acts of self-
harm.29 This too was found to be an unsubstantiated alle-
gation, but a pattern or regime of representation was now
apparent. Under pressure, or to gain electoral mileage out
of their tough stance, the Government appeared quite will-
ing to portray asylum seekers as irresponsible and selfish
people, with little regard for their children’s well-being or
safety.
Meanwhile, Australia continued to be the only regime in
the world with a mandatory detention policy applied to
children, and continued to lock up young children in defi-
ance of international treaty commitments on the rights of
the child. Government rhetoric implicitly shifted the blame
to the parents for putting their children in this situation.
Despite a letter from Afghani detainees expressing their
great offence at the baseless accusations of child abuse, and
urging the Prime Minister to set the record straight,30 the
Government refused to apologize.31
“Intimidation”
The lip-sewing protests were represented as an attempt to
intimidate or “blackmail” the country. Thus, Australians
were urged not to examine the morality of mandatory de-
tention, but rather the morality of the detainees. Minister
Ruddock insisted that the Government would not give in to
the threats. “If those demands are being put to obtain the
release of people that would not otherwise be released, we
can’t accede to them,”32 he said. Reflecting the “blackmail”
theme, the Prime Minister referred to the protests as forms
of “moral intimidation,”33 declaring, “[W]e will not be held
hostage to our own decency.”34
In this and other attempts to stigmatize asylum seekers
seeking protection, the Government attempted an interest-
ing role reversal: it was Australia, and its borders, that
needed protection from asylum seekers.35 Even more ironi-
cally, asylum seekers were portrayed as clever manipulators,
and accused of using a “range of behaviours designed to
intimidate…designed to appeal to our cultural and moral
values.”36 Asylum seekers’ protests at their arbitrary and
often prolonged confinement were met with denunciations
of “inappropriate behaviours,” cleverly orchestrated to in-
timidate us. This type of official rhetoric constantly de-
picted detainees as an aberrant, non-compliant population
undeserving of rights, and incarcerated for our protection.
Time and again, the Government promised not to yield to
such forms of blackmail, which sought to take advantage of
“our decency.”
Terrorism
Finally, in the charged post-September 11 environment,
Howard argued that he could not be certain that individual
asylum seekers were not linked to terrorist groups.37 To-
wards the end of the election campaign, he warned, “There
is a possibility some people having links with organizations
that we don’t want in this country might use the path of an
asylum seeker in order to get here.” The Prime Minister
stressed he had no evidence that the recent boats turned away
from Australia contained any terrorists or undesirables but, by
the same token, he could not “guarantee” otherwise.38
Associating asylum seekers with the threat of terrorism
appeared to be the sole point of these comments. Once
again, the Government demonstrated a willingness to make
baseless accusations against asylum seekers, even acknow-
ledging in this case that there was no evidence. Indeed, as
far as Australian security and intelligence organizations
could say, this was a wholly unsubstantiated and illogical
claim.
Government Control of Information
For any propaganda campaign to be effective, of course,
information flows must be strictly controlled. As the Gov-
ernment debated its various critics,39 one set of voices was
never heard. Despite their pleas occasionally smuggled
through the detention centres, an effective ban operated on
communication with asylum seekers held in detention. As
the former Australian Human Rights Commissioner Chris
Sidoti noted, “[N]o other western country permits incom-
municado detention of asylum-seekers.”40
Indeed, the federal Government went to unprecedented
lengths to ensure that the campaign of vilifying asylum
seekers would not be undermined by uncontrolled press
access to detainees. In a positively Orwellian twist, the level
of government agency and intent was revealed in the Senate
inquiry. Under cross examination, the director of defence
communication strategies, Brian Humphreys, told the
hearing that Ross Hampton had directly instructed defence
photographers not take pictures of asylum seekers. The
Navy was apparently given explicit guidelines to ensure “no
personalising or humanising images” were to be taken.
Defence officials said Mr. Reith’s staff did not want to allow
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photographs to create sympathy for asylum seekers. Sub-
sequently, defence media liaison director Tim Bloomfield
described Government restrictions preventing any military
comment on asylum seekers operations as “a form of cen-
sorship.”41
Similarly, Department of Immigration, Multicultural-
ism and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) restrictions on jour-
nalists prevent them from interviewing any person detained
under Australian immigration law. This effective gag on the
press requires that “[a]n Immigration Officer will accom-
pany journalists at all times,” and further that “[r]epresen-
tatives of the Department will view the photographs/film
for use with the resulting report/s.” Ostensibly, these pro-
visions are meant to ensure that staff or people detained are
not identifiable. Effectively, they also ensure that the Aus-
tralian press cannot respond to pleas to be heard.42
Later, when the “children overboard” story was revealed
as a fabrication, the Government defended its behaviour by
accusing its critics of being “un-Australian.”43 The stigma
of being “foreign” or “other” to Australian values and
identity was quickly shifted to any and all domestic critics
of Government policy. In January 2002, one of Ruddock’s
senior advisors resigned, apparently no longer able to tol-
erate the cynical media strategy routinely employed when-
ever Government immigration policy was criticized.
According to Neville Roach, “[E]very time a humanitarian
issue is raised in relation to the asylum seekers, their devi-
ousness and even criminal intent is proclaimed.” Roach
believed that the Government had provided “comfort to the
prejudiced side of human nature,” and that the wider com-
munity would be victimized by it.44
“Queue Jumpers,” “Illegals,” and “Rejectees”
Throughout the period under discussion, senior Govern-
ment figures and elements of the mainstream press sought
to portray the arrivals of onshore asylum seekers as a na-
tional “crisis.” The representation of the issue as one of
“border protection” – and of the Government bravely stand-
ing up to various forms of international pressure – enhanced
the view among sections of the Right that the issue was no
less than one of national sovereignty. The Prime Minister’s
election message that “We will decide who comes to this
country, and the circumstances under which they come”
played directly upon this fear. Today, Australians no longer
pass through customs on their return home, they go through
“border control.”
For several years now, the primary public labels em-
ployed to describe onshore asylum seekers have been those
of “queue jumpers” and “illegals.”45 The term “queue
jumper,” particularly prominent in public discourse, is a
term designed to suggest that onshore arrivals are undeserv-
ing – having taken a resettlement position from a more
worthy (and certainly more grateful and compliant) “off-
shore” refugee. Playing upon notions of fairness and order-
liness, Ruddock has even likened onshore asylum seekers to
“thieves” who “steal” places from genuine refugees. Despite
the absence of any “queue” in receiving countries such as
Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia,46 this language has been effec-
tive in depicting asylum seekers as unworthy of protection.
The evolving use of language to portray asylum seekers
as undeserving took a new twist in May 2002, when Rud-
dock started to use a new term – “rejectee” – to describe
those in detention whose claims were on appeal after an
initial refusal. After the Refugee Council of Australia pub-
licly described the label as “part of a systematic use of
language to dehumanise people who have come here to seek
protection,” Ruddock defended the term, maintaining that
it was “an accurate description” for “a cohort of peo-
ple…whose claims are prima facie not for approval.”47
The Role of Government Policy
The irony of many of these stigmatizing labels is that most
of the so-called “inappropriate behaviours” are the direct or
indirect products of Government policy. In the case of
“queue jumping,” it was the present Government that first
linked the onshore and offshore refugee categories into one
program, thus ensuring that onshore arrivals did in fact deny
places to offshore refugees.48 Even so, the humanitarian
immigration quota has not been filled in recent years, bely-
ing the rhetoric that “deserving” refugees are missing out.
And now that “Pacific solution” asylum seekers held on
Nauru and PNG are to be considered “offshore” applicants,
the distinction is becoming increasingly thin.49 Similarly,
according to immigration lawyers, there is a well-grounded
belief among detainees at Woomera that authorities only
respond to serious incidents of self-harm.50 As Joseph Pugli-
ese argues, lip sewing – a symbolic protest against silencing
– should in fact be seen as a product of Australian culture:
“we produce it legislatively, juridically, and penally.”51 Fi-
nally, the restrictions on family reunion imposed by the
Temporary Protection Visa effectively force many families
to accompany their husbands and fathers on the perilous
boat journeys from Indonesia, with tragic consequences in
the case of SIEV X, in which 353 lives were lost.
Temporary Protection Visas
As Sharon Pickering argues, these representational regimes
portraying asylum seekers as a threat to the nation seek to
validate a host of increasingly repressive state responses.52
This paper concludes by examining the way these repre-
sentations of refugees as “undeserving” have been paralleled
by new Temporary Protection Visa regulations in Australia.
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In October 1999, the federal Government introduced
Visa Subclass 785, the Temporary Protection Visa (TPV).
In so doing, it overturned an erstwhile principle of refugee
protection: that genuine refugees should not be penalized
for their method of entry.53 The TPV became the centre-
piece of a new policy of deterrence, offering temporary
protection to unauthorized “onshore” arrivals found to be
genuine refugees.54 Initially, TPV holders were able to apply
for Permanent Protection Visas (PPVs) after thirty months.
However, subsequent amendments in September 2001 –
which prohibit the ultimate issue of a PPV to any person
found to have resided for seven days in a country of first
asylum (e.g., Indonesia) en route to Australia –effectively
mean that most TPVs will never meet the criteria for a PPV.
These amendments also excised certain territories from the
“migration zone.” In doing so, they provided the basis for
the so-called “Pacific solution” by deeming arrivals at these
designated places to be ineligible for a visa of any kind.
The year before the introduction of the TPV, Ruddock
had pilloried the concept of temporary protection when it
was proposed by the One Nation Party, rejecting it as
“highly unconscionable,” “totally unacceptable,” and
“quite extreme.”55 In practice, the TPV has fostered exactly
the type of uncertainty and insecurity among traumatized
refugees that Ruddock had predicted when criticizing One
Nation’s immigration agenda.56
The attempt to portray unauthorized arrivals as “unde-
serving” was directly paralleled by the provisions of Tem-
porary Protection. The TPV policy has created two classes
of refugees, in terms both of security of tenure and of rights.
Of particular concern, TPVs have no right to family reunion
programs and no right of return if they leave the country.
As such, many TPVs are permanently isolated from their
spouses and children. TPVs are also denied access to Com-
monwealth Government settlement services offered to
PPVs, including English language classes, housing assis-
tance, and migrant resource centre support schemes. The
Government has created a situation of open discrimination
against TPV holders, who are specifically excluded from
these settlement services and from some mainstream serv-
ices including access to subsidized tertiary education. As
Fethi Mansouri and Melek Bagdas argue, this policy has
resulted in considerable levels of anguish and hardship for
already traumatized asylum seekers and has placed severe
strain on community sector agencies and services.57 The
TPV policy has promoted insecurity, isolation, confusion,
and a range of health problems among the holders of these
visas.
The harsh and unusual character of the TPV regime is
most evident in the light of international comparisons.
Internationally, the concept of temporary protection has
been seen as valid in cases of mass refugee movements,
where individual status determinations are impractical in
the short term, or, as in the case of the United Kingdom’s
Exceptional Leave to Remain, where an application for
refugee status has been rejected but the person has been
found to be at risk of human rights abuse. At a policy level,
therefore, direct comparisons with Australia’s TPV regime
are not easy to make. Australia remains the only country to
provide “temporary” sanctuary to those who have been
recognized as convention refugees. Under the TPV policy,
some of the most vulnerable people in the Australian com-
munity live with the ongoing fear of being refused a visa
extension after three years, and are deemed ineligible for
family reunion, English classes, and a range of settlement
assistance measures.
Conclusion
The federal election campaign of 2001 saw the definition of
asylum seekers as a political problem, or “crisis,” and wit-
nessed the rise of a new set of asylum policies, ominously
entitled the “Pacific solution.”58 The human impacts of these
policies are profound, and there has been no genuine “solu-
tion” aside from an expensive and unsustainable policy of
exporting onshore arrivals to Australia’s Pacific neighbours.
In the meantime, the rhetoric aimed at so-called “illegals”
and “queue jumpers” is starting to impact on all refugees and
migrants in Australia. For Temporary Protection Visa hold-
ers in particular, the Government’s rhetorical depiction of
asylum seekers as “undeserving” was directly paralleled by
policy changes, which deny a range of rights and services to
“onshore” arrivals found to be refugees. Most disturbingly,
Government attacks portraying asylum seekers as serial
child abusers were also paralleled – those on TPVs remain
ineligible, presumed “undeserving,” for the family reunion
program. Far from offering protection, the TPV policy pro-
longs and compounds the trauma of many asylum seekers
in Australia today.
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